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ABSTRACT
Motion-based fall detection systems are concerned with detecting
falls from vulnerable users, which is typically performed by classi-
fying measurements from a body-worn inertial measurement unit
(IMU) using machine learning. Such systems, however, necessitate
the collection of high-resolution measurements that may violate
users’ privacy, such as revealing their gait, activities of daily living
(ADLs), and relative position using dead reckoning. In this paper,
we investigate the application of multi-party computation (MPC)
to IMU-based fall detection for protecting device measurement con-
fidentiality. Our system is evaluated in a cloud-based setting that
precludes parties from learning the underlying data using multiple,
disparate cloud instances deployed in three geographical config-
urations. Using a publicly-available dataset, we demonstrate that
MPC-based fall detection from IMUmeasurements is practical while
achieving state-of-the-art error rates. In the best case, our system
executes in 365.2 milliseconds, which falls well within the required
time window for on-device data acquisition (750ms).
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Security services; Distributed systems
security; Domain-specific security and privacy architectures; • Com-
puter systems organization→ Cloud computing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Falls are the leading cause of fatal injury and the most common
cause of nonfatal, trauma-related hospital admissions among older
adults, with 20–30% of mild-to-severe injuries and 40% of injury-
related fatalities [34]. The annual medical costs attributable to fatal
and nonfatal falls was estimated at $50bn (USD) in 2015 [16]. Fall
detection systems are concerned with automatically detecting the
occurrence of falls within the homes of elderly and disabled users,
with the aim of minimising response times to potential injuries
and facilitating independent living [33]. These systems involve the
collection of data, such as accelerometer data from a body-worn
device [1, 14, 25, 27, 31, 38, 47], video imagery from cameras in the
home [15, 24, 30, 48], and proximity sensors in ceilings [43]. This
data is typically classified with respect to a dataset of known fall
and non-fall data using machine learning.
The deployment challenges surrounding fall detection systems
have, to date, remained largely out-of-scope in current work, which
implicitly assume a local deployment or focus solely on classifica-
tion performance using off-line analyses. Recent work has touted
the benefits of a cloud-based, software-as-a-service (SaaS) approach
for mobility-based sensing systems, where applications and their
underlying platform can be updated, upgraded, monitored and
secured with greater flexibility [13, 17, 20]. This is important in
managing large numbers of remote devices, where patch penetra-
tion remains a significant challenge [35]. Indeed, failing to update
devices could lead to potentially unsafe misclassification errors due
to accuracy discrepancies between implementations.
This principle of algorithm agility provides greater flexibility
in changing the underlying classification algorithm in a cloud-
based scenario without potential penetration issues of patching and
updating large numbers of devices in the field. Another benefit lies
in the separation of the platform development, e.g. device hardware,
firmware and software, from the algorithm implementation itself.
In this paradigm, individual device OEMs1 are relinquished from
the responsibility of implementing and maintaining the detection
algorithm. Rather, this can be performed by a dedicated third-party
with the potential of supporting devices from multiple OEMs in a
service-oriented architecture, which we focus upon in this work.
A myriad of security and privacy concerns remain, however,
regarding large volumes of data being harvested, used or, indeed,
misused by SaaS providers [49]. At worst, sensor measurements col-
lected from users’ devices could be exploited to infer their activity
patterns and whereabouts, with major privacy implications. This
is compounded by the risks of disclosing plaintext measurements,
say, after the exploitation of a vulnerable service, such as insecure
1OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer.
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Figure 1: High-level workflow for MPC-based fall detection.
AWS S3 buckets [7]. A large corpus of work has already demon-
strated identifying users based on their gait from accelerometer
and other inertial measurement unit (IMU) data [18, 19, 22, 29, 44];
their position using dead reckoning [23, 37, 46]; and determining
activities of daily living (ADLs), like whether the user is walking,
sleeping, and sitting [21, 41]. Existing work on privacy-enhancing
fall detection has focussed on non-cryptographic techniques for
video-based methods, including image blurring, silhouetting and
foreground extraction. However, these still reveal significant infor-
mation about users, such as their presence. Moreover, they do not
generalise to the significant proportion of fall detection proposals
using time-series IMU measurements from personal devices, such
as smartphones and smartwatches [1, 5, 31, 38, 45].
A promising solution is multi-party computation (MPC), where
measurements are split using a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS)
and distributed to mutually distrusting parties. After this, functions
can be jointly computed without parties disclosing their plaintext
inputs to others. Existing literature work has already shown thatma-
chine learning inferencing, upon which many fall detection systems
rely, can be performed efficiently using MPC. This includes MPC-
based image recognition using support vector machines (SVMs) [28]
and remote rehabilitation treatment classification from patient data
using decision trees [11].
In this work, we present the implementation and evaluation of
the first system for perform MPC-based fall detection from IMU
device data in order to protect measurement confidentiality. MPC
is used to perform the requisite feature extraction and classification
without the parties learning the contents of IMU measurements
received from the device. We evaluate the system, illustrated in
Figure 1, using an off-the-shelf device and three MPC parties de-
ployed using a public cloud service. In short, this work presents the
following contributions:
• The first framework for performing privacy-enhancing fall
detection from device IMU measurements using MPC. The
proposal preserves measurement confidentiality in a cloud-
based model while performing feature extraction and classi-
fication using machine learning.
• A two-part evaluation with experiments conducted using
a publicly-available fall detection dataset. Our inferencing
framework executes faster than the time necessary for on-
device measurement acquisition, and achieves error rates
commensurate with state-of-the-art schemes.
1.1 Document Structure
This paper proceeds with a general review of fall detection systems
in Section 2, which is followed by a discussion of the privacy chal-
lenges associated with existing systems. In Section 3, we present the
assumptions and threat model in greater detail, before introducing
and motivating the use of MPC as a solution to the aforementioned
challenges. This section also develops the design of the proposed
framework after which, in Section 4, the implementation details
are discussed. Section 5 presents an evaluation of the proposed
framework, comprising a discussion of the methodology and ex-
perimental results in the form of classification and computational
performance. Lastly, we conclude our work in Section 6, including
a discussion of future research directions.
2 FALL DETECTION
Fall detection systems fall broadly into two categories: 1), those
using devices situated in the user’s ambient environment; and, 2),
those using body-worn devices (BWDs), e.g. smartwatches. We
now describe prominent existing schemes and their operation. This
section is not an exhaustive analysis—for this, the reader is referred
to Mubashir et al. [33] and Delahoz et al. [12]—but, rather, we aim
to summarise the salient approaches and results.
2.1 Ambient Device-based Systems
Privacy-enhancing fall detection has focused almost entirely on
non-cryptographic techniques from ambient-based devices, such as
silhouetting, blurring and foreground masking from camera data.
Mastorakis and Makris [30] and Zhang et al. [48] employ RGBD
data from a Microsoft Kinect to detect five ADLs, using only the
depth values and foreground mask of the RGB data, thus occluding
users’ facial features. Tao et al. [43] study the use of a ceiling-based
sensor network comprising infrared cameras for fall detection in a
home environment. The sensors output binary values to indicate the
existence of persons underneath, which are used to model a map of
the user’s home. Edgcomb and Vahid [15] explore four techniques
for privacy-enhancing video-based fall detection: blurring (of the
user), silhouetting, and covering the user with a graphical box and
oval. Raw video imagery is first taken from a stationary in-home
camera, before applying one of these techniques.
2.2 BWD-based Systems
The use of ambient-based devices has inherent issues associated
with detecting falls in occluded areas: fitting multiple cameras
to cover all possible locations in the user’s living environment—
bathroom, bedroom, kitchen, and so on—may impose significant
costs relating to unit installation and maintenance. Another para-
digm employs devices likely to be already owned and carried by
the user, such as a smartwatch or smartphone. Unlike the previ-
ous section, we are unaware of proposals that investigate privacy-
enhancing fall detection from BWDs to the best of our knowledge.
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As such, we provide a general review of highly-cited and state-of-
the-art work from the literature.
Mauldin et al. [31] present SmartFall, which uses accelerometer
data sampled at 31.25Hz from a user-worn smartwatch to detect
user falls. Smartwatch data is streamed to the user’s smartphone
that extracts features pertaining to the vector magnitude of the
accelerometer data and the difference between the maximum and
minimum magnitudes over a 750ms sliding window (Equations 1
and 2). Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Recur-
rent Neural Network (RNN) classifiers are evaluated using labelled
data from seven volunteers between 21–55 years old, alongside the
Farseeing dataset [32] with data from 2,000 participants. Results
of 0.37–0.79 precision, 0.55–1.0 recall, and 0.65–0.99 accuracy are
reported, depending on the chosen dataset and classifier.
| ®v | =
√
x2 + y2 + z2 (1)
∆s = max(| ®vi |) −min(| ®vj |), i , j (2)
Liu and Cheng [25] investigate IMUs placed at users’ waists
that collects accelerometer measurements at 200Hz. The vector
magnitude is computed, along with the fast changed vector, vertical
acceleration and posture angle between the vertical acceleration
and gravity over a 0.1s sliding window. The features are inputted to
an SVMwith labelled fall data from 15 volunteers who performed 10
simulated falls and 11 ADLs repeated 10 times. The proposal yields
error rates of 98.38% accuracy, 97.40% recall, and 99.27% precision.
Santoyo-Ramón et al. [38] investigate IMUs attached to the user’s
chest, waist, wrist and thigh—the data from which is aggregated
into 15 second segments by a smartphone. A sliding window of
0.5s is used in which the fast changed vector of accelerometer mea-
surements is computed alongside the magnitudes’ mean, standard
deviation and mean absolute distance, and the mean rotation angle
and mean module of the (Y ,Z ) and (X ,Z ) components. The fea-
tures are inputted to SVM, k-Nearest Neighbour, Naïve Bayes and
Decision Tree classifiers, and evaluated using data from 19 subjects
who performed 746 ADLs and falls. The geometric mean of the
precision and recall is used as the performance metric, with results
of 0.614–0.999 depending on the algorithm and sensor combination.
Doukas et al. [14] investigate the use of an accelerometer at-
tached to the user’s foot for fall detection. The sensor data is trans-
mitted to a receiving device, such as a laptop, where it is normalised
and inputted to an SVM classifier in raw form after applying a
Kalman filter. The evaluation reports a classification accuracy of
98.2% using a limited set of labelled data from two volunteers.
Cao et al. [5] present E-FallD, which uses accelerometer data from
an Android smartphone. The vector magnitude of the accelerometer
components is computed and a global threshold is fixed for identify-
ing falls based on the phone’s measured acceleration. The work also
investigates multiple thresholds customised to the user’s gender,
age, and body mass index (BMI). The authors recruit 20 participants
of varying gender, age and BMI, who perform a total of 400 falls
and 1200 ADLs. The approach yields results of 86.75% precision
and 85.5% recall using global thresholds, and 92.75% precision and
86.75% recall with customised thresholds.
Similarly, Vilarinho et al. [45] use accelerometer data from an
Android smartphone and smartwatch. Here, a rule-based system is
devised for threshold-based detection using the vector magnitude,
fall index, and absolute vertical acceleration as features over a
0.8s sliding window. The approach is evaluated using data from
three participants, who performed 12 falls and 7 ADLs each, with a
reported 0.68 classification accuracy, 0.78 precision, and 0.63 recall.
Yavuz et al. [47] propose another system based on accelerometer
values from an Android smartphone. In contrast, the authors use
solely frequency domain features, namely the wavelet coefficients
after applying a discrete wavelet transform. A threshold-based
approach is used to test the coefficients generated from the phone
against those of previously observed falls. 100 fall sequences from
five volunteers were collected to evaluate the system, with results
of 46-95% precision and 88-90% recall.
Albert et al. [1] use accelerometer values from an LG G1 Android
smartphone located at the user’s pelvic region. 178 features across
several categories are subsequently extracted: moments, e.g. kur-
tosis and skew; moments between successive samples; smoothed
root mean squares; extremities, e.g. min and max; histogram values;
Fourier components; mean acceleration magnitude; and cross prod-
ucts. The features are inputted to five classifiers—SVM, Logistic
Regression, Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree and kNN—and evaluated
using data from 18 simulated falls from 15 subjects, resulting in
98% classification accuracy.
Musci et al. [34] evaluate the use of recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) and long short-term memory units (LSTMs), and propose
a deep learning architecture for ternary fall detection for whether
or not a fall has occurred, and whether one is about to occur. The
proposal is evaluated using the SisFall dataset from [42], comprising
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements from a smartphone
and a custom IMU attached to the waists of 38 users; the dataset is
labelled with respect to the three aforementioned states. A confu-
sion matrix of the three classes reports 92.86–97.16% classification
accuracy following hyperparameter optimisation.
Luštrek and Kaluža [27] explore the use of a body area network
(BAN) comprising 12 IMUs at the user’s shoulders, wrists, hips,
knees and ankles. Features are collected regarding the coordinates
of units in a body coordinate system, their velocities, absolute
distance, and relative angles. The features are used as input to seven
machine learning algorithms—SVM, DT, kNN, NB, Random Forest,
Adaboost, and bagging—implemented in the Weka library. Three
participants were recruited who performed a total of 45 activities:
15 falls and 10 lying down, sitting down and walking ADLs each.
73.4–96.3% classification accuracy is reported depending on the
algorithm used, with SVM yielding the best case.
2.3 Discussion
Generally, fall detection systems rely upon traditional supervised
learning algorithms and, more recently, deep neural networks
(LSTMs and RNNs), trained over labelled fall data collected a priori.
The majority of existing work models binary classification, i.e. ‘fall’
or ‘not fall’, while other work also models whether a fall may be
about to occur and classification of general ADLs, such as sitting,
walking, and lying down.
Additionally, the generation of global models that generalise to
all users, rather than individuals, is also a common facet of current
work. For BWD-based systems, accelerometer measurements are
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Figure 2: Overview of IMU-based binary fall detection.
used ubiquitously from which a variety of features are extracted
prior to classification, which is illustrated in Figure 2 for the bi-
nary case. Most work focuses on time-domain features, such as
the vector magnitude, arithmetic mean, standard deviation, and
maximum and minimum values. The choice of algorithm remains
varied, although SVMs tend to exhibit the best performance with
0.9838 [25], 0.982 [14] and 0.73–0.99 [31] accuracy. Recent work
[31, 34] has begun to explore the application of deep learning using
LSTMs and RNNs with promising results—0.9286–0.9716 [34] and
0.85–0.99 [31] accuracy—but work in the area remains limited.
Rather than using machine learning for the discovery of opti-
mal decision boundaries, another widely-used approach has been
the use of manually set threshold values, which are discovered ex-
perimentally. Proponents of this approach have touted faster clas-
sification as an advantage over machine learning-based systems,
and thus more suitable for constrained devices; however, such ap-
proaches generally yield higher error rates and are evaluated over
limited datasets, e.g. with five [47] and three [45] participants. We
present a summary of BWD-based systems in Table 1.
3 PRIVACY-ENHANCING BWD-BASED FALL
DETECTION
To the best of our knowledge, privacy-enhancing BWD-based fall
detection is yet to be investigated. Accelerometers, used in the
bulk of current proposals, measure fine-grained movements at high
frequency rates (typically >30Hz) on commodity devices, such
as smartphones and smartwatches. A wealth of literature exists
surrounding the identification of users based on their gait using
accelerometer measurements alone from such devices [18, 19, 22,
29, 44]. Furthermore, we are also aware of IMUmeasurements being
used for recognising non-fall ADLs [21, 41] and performing user
position tracking using dead reckoning [23, 37, 46], which could be
exploited to violate user privacy.
3.1 Applying Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
We observe that MPC can be applied to acquire data, extract fea-
tures, and perform fall classification in a way that preserves IMU
measurement confidentiality. In this work, we tackle the base case of
MPC using arithmetic secret sharing from Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme (SSSS) [40], which is briefly described as follows.
Table 1: Comparison of BWD-based fall detection systems.
Proposals Algorithms Error Rates
SmartFall [31] NB, SVM, RNN 0.37–0.79 (P), 0.55–1.0 (R),0.65–0.99 (A)
Liu & Cheng [25] SVM 0.9927 (P), 0.9740 (R),0.9838 (A)
S-R et al. [38] SVM, kNN,NB, DT 0.614–0.999 (GMPR)
Doukas et al. [14] SVM 0.982 (A)
E-FallD [5] Thresholds GT: 0.8675 (P), 0.855 (R)CT: 0.9275 (P), 0.8675 (R)
Vilarinho et al. [45] Thresholds 0.78 (P), 0.63 (R), 0.68 (A)
Yavuz et al. [47] Thresholds 0.88–0.90 (P), 0.46–0.95 (R)
Albert et al. [1] SVM, LR, NB,DT, kNN 0.982 (A)
Musci et al. [34] RNN, LSTM 0.9286–0.9716 (A)
Luštrek & Kaluža [27]
SVM, DT, kNN,
NB, RF, Adaboost,
Bagging
0.732–0.963 (A)
P: Precision, R: Recall, A: Classification accuracy, GMPR: Geometric
mean of precision and recall.
3.1.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme. SSSS divides a secret S into
n shares, s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn }, such that knowing t shares from s
makes S easy to compute, but knowing fewer shares than t renders
S undetermined. The scheme relies on the fact that t points are
required to construct a polynomial of degree t − 1, which is defined
in the field FP . Next, t − 1 positive integers, a1, . . . ,at−1 are chosen
with ai < P , with the secret assigned as a0 = S. The polynomial
f (x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + a3x3 + · · · + at−1xt−1 is built with which
n points are constructed from i = 1, . . . ,n, to retrieve pairs (i, f (i)).
Any subset with t distinct pairs can be used to recover the constant
term, a0, i.e. the secret, which is found using Lagrange interpolation.
3.1.2 MPC from Arithmetic Secret Sharing. An important obser-
vation is that SSSS allows each party to locally compute linear
combinations of secrets and public values. Firstly, let us define
[x]i as the ith share of data item, x . SSSS allows parties to locally
compute the following arithmetic operations over their shares [6]:
• Addition ([c] ← [a] + [b]): Each party pi can compute a
new share, [c]i , that is the addition of two other shares, i.e.
[c]i = [a]i + [b]i .
• Addition of a secret and public value ([c] ← [a] + α ,α ∈ FP ):
Party pi can compute a new share from the addition of a
held share and a public value α ∈ FP ; that is, [c]i = [a]i + α .
• Multiplication of a secret and public value ([c] ← [a] · α ,α ∈
FP ): pi can compute a new share of the multiplication of a
held share with a public value, [c]i = [a]i · α .
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Table 2: Communication cost forMPC functions using arith-
metic secret sharing [6].
Function CommunicationCost (in rounds)
Multiplication 1
Inner Product 1
Inverse 1
Random element 1
Random bit 3
Equality (=) 2
≥ 2m + 4
≤ 2m + 4
AND, OR 2 log(k)
Where k is the number of operands
andm is the bound x ,y ∈ [0, 2m − 1]
wherein operands x and y lie.
Computing a new share that is the multiplication of two others,
[c] = [a] · [b], is less straightforward: given that SSSS uses polyno-
mials of degree t , then [a ·b] , [a]i ·[b]i , as the resulting polynomial
has degree 2t . A method for computing t-degree polynomials repre-
senting [c] ← [a] · [b] was presented in [4]. As opposed to entirely
local computation for addition of shares and the addition and mul-
tiplication of a share with a constant value, multiplying shares
necessitates one round of communication. While many functions
can be computed using only these operations, they preclude integer
comparison, e.g. =, ,, <, and >, and Boolean operations, e.g. AND
and OR. The reader is referred to [6] for a comprehensive descrip-
tion and analysis of these protocols; the differences in asymptotic
communication complexity are reproduced from [6] in Table 2.
3.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
An outsourcing model is assumed whereby a body-worn device
streams IMU measurements to a cloud-based service that performs
the feature extraction and classification. The focus is on binary
classification for inferring the occurrence of falls using a globally-
trained model in line with the bulk of existing work from Section 2.
We divide the entities involved into two categories.
3.2.1 Source device. We assume the existence of a body-worn
device—a smartphone in the user’s pocket, smartwatch, a sensor
placed on the user’s belt, or otherwise—with an IMU. The device
is also assumed to possess the ability to split measurements into
shares using SSSS and stream them to an Internet-facing service
over a secure channel, such as TLS using a pre-installed certificate.
In this work, the IMU measurements are considered to be trusted;
the focus is on the unauthorised disclosure of measurements after
departing the device over a network to a cloud-based service.
3.2.2 Cloud service. Comprises the software components—database
instance, REST APIs, and so on—for receiving, storing and classi-
fying falls from IMU sensor data on a public cloud platform. The
primary threat is the exfiltration and disclosure of raw IMU mea-
surements from a remote attacker, such as from an unsecured,
public-facing database, e.g. AWS S3 bucket, which could be used to
model and infer users’ general ADLs, position, or gait for user iden-
tification. This work tackles the base case for MPC where parties
operate under an honest-but-curious model, whereby the proto-
col specification is executed as intended. We also assume that the
output, i.e. whether or not a fall occurred, is learned by the cloud
services in order to contact an emergency number or provide alter-
native remediation. We note that some information may be revealed
by the communication between the device and the cloud service,
such as the absence of receiving protected IMU data at certain times
of day, e.g. at night where the user deactivates their smartphone
or smartwatch before sleeping. However, this is orthogonal to the
ultimate goal of this work of preventing either the service or an
external adversary from learning additional information from IMU
measurements beyond that intended for detecting falls.
3.3 Workflow
The principle stages of the proposed system were illustrated previ-
ously in Figure 1 and described as follows:
(1) Data acquisition. The collection of tri-axial IMU data on
the device, e.g. smartphone, at an appropriate sampling fre-
quency. This may be unimodal input, i.e. only accelerome-
ter [5, 14, 25, 31, 47]; multi-modal, e.g. accelerometer and
gyroscope together [38]; or aggregating measurements from
multiple sensors in a body-area network [27].
(2) Secret sharing. Given a tri-axial IMU sample, [Ax ,Ay ,Az ],
the master device splits each component into n shares using
SSSS. In this work, we setn equal to the number of authorised
communicating parties, while the reconstruction threshold
is fixed at t = 3. In short, IMU samples are split as follows:
D = ©­«
[Ax ]0 [Ax ]1 [Ax ]2 · · · [Ax ]n
[Ay ]0 [Ay ]1 [Ay ]2 · · · [Ay ]n
[Az ]0 [Az ]1 [Az ]2 · · · [Az ]n
ª®¬
Where the rows comprise the individual shares of a particular
component, while each column represents the ith share of
all components.
(3) Share distribution. The device individually transmits the col-
umn elements from D to each cloud service instance; that is,
[Ax ]0, [Ay ]0 and [Az ]0, is sent to party P0, [Ax ]1, [Ay ]1 and
[Az ]1 to P1, and so on. By sharing each sample independently,
no single cloud-based party may recover the underlying IMU
samples assuming the reconstruction threshold above.
(4) MPC-based inferencing. The parties use arithmetic operations
upon the received shares to perform fall detection feature
extraction, such as computing the vector magnitude of IMU
samples, and subsequent classification using a desired ma-
chine learning classifiers, e.g. support vector machine (SVM),
logistic regression (LR), and naïve Bayes (NB).
(5) Classification decision. The resulting label, L ∈ {0, 1}, is
used to denote the occurrence of a fall in a binary fashion.
This value may be used to raise an alarm or telephone an
emergency contact number.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes the implementation of the device- and cloud-
side systems introduced in the previous section.
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Table 3: MPC server location configurations using AWS.
Config Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
A US_Oregon Canada_Central US_Ohio
B US_Oregon Canada_Central Europe_London
C US_Oregon Europe_London Asia_Singapore
4.1 Device Application
A Python application was developed that reads CSV IMU data
line-by-line from file and creates shares of each sensor modality
component using SSSS. The resulting shares are base 64-encoded
and JSON-formatted, and transmitted over TLS to their respec-
tive cloud parties using the method described in Section 3.3. The
application was deployed on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, with a
Broadcom BCM2837 system-on-chip with a quad-core ARM Cortex-
A53 at 1.2GHz, 1GB RAM, and Broadcom BCM43438 WiFi module
(802.11N, 150 Mbit/s at 2.4GHz). The board was connected to a
corporate WiFi network over which all communications occurred.
Benchmarking procedures were also implemented using the Python
time module, which wraps functions from the GNU C standard
library, for measuring the upload time for transmitting the shares
and receiving an acknowledgement from the server.
4.2 Cloud Framework
We developed a cloud-based framework for performing MPC using
arithmetic secret sharing comprising three applications.
Web server . A Python web server application that implements a
public-facing service for retrieving JSON-formatted shares from the
device application; performs database initialisation, storage, and
retrieval; and bootstraps the launching of MPC-based operations
with other parties and returns the result to the device.
MPyC instance. Wemake use ofMPyC—an open-source Python
library developed by Schoenmakers [39] intended for the rapid pro-
totyping of MPC-based systems. MPyC is based on the VIFF frame-
work by Damgård et al. [9], which implements numerous MPC
operation protocols using arithmetic secret sharing, and abstracts
the complexity of network management, e.g. socket connections,
message formatting and transmission, and reconstructing and com-
puting upon shares between the parties.
Database. Stores time-series IMU shares received from the de-
vice application; our implementation uses MongoDB2, a JSON
document-based NoSQL database.
4.2.1 Deployment. We deploy our architecture using three MPC
parties deployed in geographically disparate locations available via
AWS: US West (Oregon), US East (Ohio), Central Canada, Europe
(London), and South East Asia (Singapore). These configurations
are listed in Table 3, representing a strictly North American de-
ployment (Config A), North America and Europe (Config B), and
North America, Europe and Asia (Config C). The three server-side
applications, listed above, were deployed collectively on separate
AWS EC2 instances in their respective region; each instance was
also pre-loaded with the other instances’ TLS certificates and static
IP addresses in configuration files. We use three t2.micro AWS
2MongoDB: https://www.mongodb.com
instances, featuring a single-core Intel Xeon Scalable Processor at
3.3 GHz, with 1GB RAM and up to 0.72Gbit/s network throughput.
At the time of publication, this incurs an operating cost of $0.0116
(USD) per hour, or $8.47 per month per instance [2].
4.2.2 Feature Extraction. In this work, we implement MPC-based
feature extraction for replicating the SmartFall proposal by Mauldin
et al. [31], which uses two features: the samples’ vector magnitudes,
and the difference between the maximum and minimum magni-
tudes, ∆s (Equations 1 and 2 respectively), over a sliding window
of 750ms. This is managed in our framework by aggregating shares
in an array of size 24, assuming a sampling frequency of 31.25Hz
as in [31]. The vector magnitude is found for each sample via the
Newton-Raphson method for computing the square root, while ∆s
relies upon MPyC’s maximum and minimum functions of a list
of secret-shared elements. These are internally implemented by
recursively finding the maximum (or minimum) of each list half,
computing their difference, and performing a ≥ or ≤ operation with
zero—the costs of which were listed in Table 2.
An important observation is that the choice of features dramat-
ically affects the asymptotic cost of MPC-based operations. Fea-
tures reliant upon large numbers of multiplication, comparison or
Boolean operationswill necessitatemany rounds of inter-party com-
munication versus features that can be computed locally, such as
additions or multiplications with public values, as noted in Section
3.1.2. We note that the SmartFall features, i.e. the vector magnitude
and computing ∆s in a sliding window, imposes significant cost for
the square root and minimum and maximum functions respectively.
To address this, we also explore derivative-based features, which
are used extensively for feature extraction in computer vision tasks
[3, 8, 26]. In particular, inspired by the SURF features used in Bay et
al. [3], we use the sum of the derivatives and the sum of the squared
derivatives for each data channel within the window, resulting in a
six-dimensional feature vector, f , listed in Equation 3.
f =
∑ dx
dt
,
∑ dy
dt
,
∑ dz
dt
,
∑ (dx
dt
)2
,
∑ (dy
dt
)2
,
∑ (dz
dt
)2 (3)
Where dxdt ,
dy
dt , and
dz
dt represent the differentials of the x , y an z
measurement components respectively. The derivative is computed
by convolution as follows:
du
dt
= Au ∗ h (4)
Where Au is the u-th component of an accelerometer measure-
ment and h is a filter kernel with impulse response [−0.5, 0, 0.5].
This feature extraction scheme is substantially more efficient, re-
quiring only a single round of inter-party communication for each
derivative squaring operation; the summing operations can be per-
formed locally without communication, as can the convolution
operation using a filter kernel that performs multiplications with
constant values.
4.2.3 Privacy-Enhancing Inferencing. Wedeveloped a range ofMPC-
based functions for privacy-preserving inferencing from measure-
ment shares, which were implemented using the fundamental oper-
ations from Section 3.1.2. At present, we have developedMPC-based
implementations of the following classifiers.
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Algorithm 1: Inner product with LSSS [6].
Data: [a] = ([a1], [a2], . . . , [am ]), [b] = ([b1], [b2], . . . , [bm ])
Result: [c], where c = ∑mj=1 aj · bj
foreach i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2t + 1} in parallel do
Party Pi computes di ← ∑mj=1[aj ]i · [bj ]i
Pi shares di into [di ] ← SSSS(di )
end
[c] ← ∑2t+1i=1 ([di ] ·∏2t+1ℓ=1, ℓ,i −ℓi−ℓ )
return [c]
Logistic Regression (LR) is a linear model of the probability of
a binary response given a feature vector, ®x = [x1,x2, . . . ,xn ]. LR
applies the logit function to ®x and parameters, ®θ , that minimise some
cost function, e.g. ordinary least squares. The decision boundary,
h, is represented by a linear combination of the parameters and
features; that is, h( ®θ , ®x) = ∑ni=0 θixi .
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) attempts to find a hyperplane
that maximises the margin (distance) between linearly separable
data points of classes in the training set. We implement a tradi-
tional SVM with linear kernel for binary classification, whereby
samples are classified using a given set of weights, ®w , feature vec-
tor, ®x , bias, b, and evaluating Equation 5. Note that, for inferencing,
both SVM and LR reduce to a single inner product. With MPC, a
naïve approach requiresm rounds of communication to compute
each θixi ; however, [10] demonstrated how to compute the inner
product of two vectors using LSSS requiring only a single round of
communication with (non-interactive) local summations, which is
reproduced in Algorithm 1 for two shared vectors, [a] and [b].
C =
{
1, if ®θ · ®x + b ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(5)
Naïve Bayes (NB) is a probabilistic classifier that uses Bayes’
Theorem with a strong independence assumption between features.
A feature vector is subsequently classified by maximising the poste-
rior probability for each class label using the prior and conditional
probabilities computed in the training phase. In our case, we use
Gaussian NB to compute the log-likelihoods of real-valued inputs,
parameterised by mean µ with variance σ 2 and evaluated as follows:
дi (®x) = ln(P(Ci )) −
n∑
j=1
| |x j − µi j | |2
2σ 2i j
(6)
Where n is the number of features and P(Ci ) is the probability of
the occurrence of class Ci .
5 EVALUATION
This section presents a two-part evaluation comprising: 1), classi-
fication error rates achieved by our framework using MPC-based
implementations of SmartFall and derivative-based features with
the three inferencing algorithms; and 2), computational performance,
for evaluating the time complexity of the framework.
5.1 Classification Error Rates
Wenow present error rates achieved by themodels used in ourMPC-
based implementations of SmartFall [31] using the standard and
Table 4: Classification error with SmartFall features.
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
LR 0.933 0.780 0.688 0.731
NB 0.926 0.704 0.762 0.732
SVM 0.936 0.819 0.663 0.733
LR: Logistic Regression, NB: Naïve Bayes, SVM: Support
Vector Machine.
Table 5: Classification error with derivative-based features.
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
LR 0.936 0.771 0.812 0.791
NB 0.934 0.725 0.903 0.804
SVM 0.937 0.762 0.835 0.797
derivative-based features described in Section 4.2.2. The authors
of [31] provide a publicly-available dataset comprising labelled
IMU accelerometer measurements. These correspond to binary fall
events from seven participants between 21–55 years old wearing a
Microsoft Band 2 smartwatch.
An off-line Python application was used to generate the model
parameters. Firstly, a sliding window of 750ms was used with data
sampled at a frequency of 31.25Hz, over which the vector magnitude
and ∆s were computed. This was repeated for the derivative-based
feature extraction. Next, six classifiers—Gaussian NB, SVM (with
linear kernel), and logistic regressionmodels for both feature types—
were trained independently using the Scikit-Learn library [36].
The inclusion of logistic regression goes beyond the classifiers
evaluated in [31]. The dataset was split using a 80:20 training-
test set ratio, and five-fold cross-validation was used to select the
best performing model, whose final error rate was measured using
the test set. The parameters of the best performing models were
subsequently exported and implemented within the inferencing
procedures detailed in Section 4.2.3.
Tables 4 and 5 presents the error rates for each model with
respect to classification accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-scores
averaged across all participants for the SmartFall and derivative-
based features respectively. The achieved results, i.e. 93.6% accuracy
and 0.733 F1-score in the best case for SVM, are commensurate
with the original SmartFall proposal and other fall detection work
listed previously in Table 1. We note that the derivative features
outperform the original features in terms of precision, recall and
F1-score, e.g. 0.804 F1-score for NB versus 0.732, and 0.835 recall for
SVM versus 0.663; however, the classification accuracy is broadly
similar for both feature types.
5.2 Computational Performance
This suite of experiments evaluates the latencies incurred by the
device and cloud entities.
5.2.1 Device-side Latency. Here, we measure the average time to
both construct the shares using SSSS and their transmission time
to n = 3 parties, with a reconstruction threshold of t = 3. This is
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Table 6: Mean feature extraction and inferencing times (mil-
liseconds) using SmartFall features for each configuration;
S.D. shown in brackets.
Config A Config B Config C
Alg. FE IN FE IN FE IN
LR | 308 (91) | 383 (104) | 507 (150)
SVM 779 (119)† — 1005 (125) — 1204 (194) —
NB | 509 (103) | 557 (226) | 692 (114)
†: Common feature extraction for all algorithms, | : Repeat all column-wise
entries, —: Repeat previous entry (column-wise), Alg.: Algorithm, FE: Feature
extraction, IN: Inferencing.
Table 7: Mean feature extraction and inferencing times (mil-
liseconds) using derivative-based features.
Config A Config B Config C
Alg. FE IN FE IN FE IN
LR | 297 (106) | 365 (95) | 490 (104)
SVM 68 (15)† — 102 (19) — 111 (24) —
NB | 552 (103) | 602 (106) | 742 (113)
†: Common feature extraction for all algorithms, | : Repeat all column-
wise entries, —: Repeat previous entry (column-wise), Alg.: Algorithm,
FE: Feature extraction, IN: Inferencing.
measured for the sharing and transmission of samples in a sliding
window of 750ms (21 samples at 31.25Hz). The mean share construc-
tion time, averaged across all windows in the dataset, took 6.1ms
(σ = 0.9), with the upload time taking 398ms (σ = 23.9ms), 404ms
(σ = 25.9ms) and 493.2ms (σ = 33.9ms) for configurations A, B
and C respectively. These timings are measured by the device-side
Python application using the time module, which executed upon a
Raspberry Pi 3 located in Belgium, Europe. The device specifications
were listed previously in Section 4.1.
5.2.2 Cloud-side Latency. Wemeasure the averagewall-clock times
of the MPC-based feature extraction and inferencing procedures,
which were described in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. The total time
for classifying each window can be considered as the sum of these
two values. These were measured within the server-side Python
application also via the time module. We report the times for each
cloud configuration using the standard SmartFall features in Table
6 and the derivative-based features in Table 7. The results are also
illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
5.3 Discussion
One concern with MPC, raised previously in Section 3.1.2, is the
inter-party communication cost for performing multiplication- and
comparison-heavy functions, which were used in the feature ex-
traction and inferencing procedures. With the original SmartFall
features, inferencing and feature extraction takes approximately
1900ms in the worst case with Naive Bayes under Config C, to
∼1100ms in the best case using LR with Config A. We also observe
that the feature extraction stage dominates the execution times
using this feature type, accounting for approximately two-thirds
of each tested algorithm’s total time. In contrast, this inverts with
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Figure 3: Mean window execution times using SmartFall fea-
tures for Config. A (no hatch), B (hatched), and C (dotted).
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Figure 4:Meanwindow execution times using derivative fea-
tures for Config. A (no hatch), B (hatched), and C (dotted).
the use of derivative features, which require fewer rounds of inter-
party communication; the inferencing stage becomes the dominant
factor for all algorithms, rather than the feature extraction. The
execution time is also substantially reduced for the derivative-based
features; reducing from 1087ms to 365ms using LR with Config A,
for example, between the SmartFall and derivative-based features
respectively. In general, the derivative-based features are extracted
∼11x faster than the originally proposed SmartFall features in [31];
the total execution time, including inferencing, exhibits a ∼2.8x
increase between derivative- and SmartFall-based experiments.
We also see that the SVM and LR algorithms execute in similar
times due to the mathematical similarities of inferencing, requiring
an inner product operation that necessitates only a single round of
communication. NB, however, is relatively expensive from requiring
two multiplications for each feature in the window: one for finding
the square of the feature subtracted from the mean, and the inverse
multiplication (division) of this value by the variance. The choice of
server configuration, i.e. the parties’ geographical distribution, also
has a significant effect on the total execution time; increasing, for
example, from approximately 1087ms to 1711ms using SmartFall
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features with SVM-based inferencing, corresponding to a ∼57%
increase from Config A to C. Similar results are exhibited for all
SmartFall- and derivative-based experiments.
Lastly, we observe that, in some instances, the total execution
time falls within that required for acquiring the measurements
within the window (750ms). This applies for all derivative-based
prediction using configurations A and B, but only the SVM and LR
inferencing algorithms using Config C. This leads us to believe that
these would be best suited for real-time prediction.
6 CONCLUSION
A plethora of fall detection systems rely upon IMU data from user-
owned commodity devices. However, as we discussed in Section
2, these proposals necessitate the collection of data that can be
used to identify users’ gait, their position using dead reckoning,
and determining their activities of daily living (ADLs). In light of
this, we presented the first investigation of the application of multi-
party computation for IMU-based fall detection with the aim of
preserving the confidentiality of sensor measurements.
We presented the design and implementation of our system in
Sections 3 and 4, which was subsequently deployed using three
AWS EC2 instances in geographically disparate locations under
three configurations. Each instance acted as an MPC participant
for jointly computing the feature extraction and inferencing proce-
dures using weights from pre-trained global models. The system
was evaluated with the original SmartFall features alongside an
exploration of derivative-based features for reducing the communi-
cation complexity imposed by MPC operations.
In Section 5, we presented the results from a two-part evaluation
of the system’s classification error and computational performance.
This was conducted using a publicly-available dataset comprising
data from seven participants wearing an off-the-shelf device. The
performance results indicate that state-of-the-art error rates can
be achieved for MPC-based fall detection—achieving 0.926–0.937
classification accuracy and 0.731–0.804 F1-score depending on the
chosen algorithm and feature set.
We also showed experimentally that the choices of inferencing
algorithm, feature extraction, and server location have substantial
effects on computational performance. The worst cases increase the
total execution total by almost three-fold versus the best performers,
which is dominated principally by the choice of features. In the best
cases—for example, using an SVM classifier with derivative-based
features in a cloud configuration in the same continent—the total
prediction time is less than the on-device data acquisition time.
This provides an indication that real-time prediction is feasible.
To conclude, we aim to pursue the following research directions
in future work:
• MPC-based fall detection using deep learning. Existing fall de-
tection systems rely heavily on traditional machine learning
classifiers; a small selection of recent work, however, has
begun to explore the use of deep neural networks (DNNs),
such as RNNs [34]. As such, a future avenue lies in exploring
MPC-based DNNs and the overhead imposed by evaluat-
ing large numbers of intermediate layers with potentially
hundreds or thousands of nodes.
• Video-based fall detection. A separate paradigm of fall de-
tection systems, described in Section 2, relies upon video
camera data from devices situated in the user’s ambient en-
vironment. This data, however, is of significantly greater
dimension than the IMU data explored in this work; a future
direction is investigating the extent to which MPC-based
fall detection can be performed with high-frequency, high-
dimensionality data.
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